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Victory in the War for Independence brought a vast amount of land within the grasp of the new American
nation—territory stretching from the Appalachian Mountains to the Mississippi River between the
southern shores of the Great Lakes and Spanish Florida. These lands were initially claimed by several
states. Pressure from states without land claims led to these lands being transferred to the national
government. The land so transferred was to be used to pay for the revolution. By 1802 this national
public domain totaled roughly 220 million acres of saleable land that was worth about $215 million
dollars at constant-dollar long-run equilibrium land prices. A public finance approach is used to explain
the choices facing the government regarding how to use its lands to pay for the revolution. The first
choice—directly swapping land for war debt—was superseded by the second choice, namely “backing”
the national debt with its land assets and pledging future proceeds from land sales to be used by law
only to redeem the principal of the national debt and nothing else. This land policy helped stabilize
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  Independence brought a vast amount of land within the grasp of the new nation—land 
unsettled by non-indigenous Americans. Choices had to be made regarding which governments 
had jurisdiction over these lands, how these lands would be used to benefit those governments as 
well as the public, and how these lands would be transferred to white settlers. Conflicts over 
which governments had jurisdiction over these lands created the first crisis of disunion. The 
choice that resolved this crisis led to other choices on how to use these lands to salvage the 
nation’s financial position. How the government would transfer these lands to the public also 
required choices over lot sizes, shapes, prices, and methods of sale. Between 1781 and 1802 
these land-policy choices were truly founding choices in that they had lasting effects on the 
economic and political trajectory of the nation.  
This short essay cannot adequately address all the land policy controversies which arose 
in the founding era. Instead, the focus will be on the key choices that affected economic 
development for which economic analysis can enhance our understanding. The essay begins by 
documenting the conflicting claims over the trans-Appalachian territories post-revolution and 
how political debate led to the transfer of some but not all of these lands to the national 
government. As a condition of political unity, states without land claims required states with 
such claims to cede them to the national government for the benefit of all. The Constitution as 
drafted in 1787 may not have occurred without this prior solution to western land claims. The 
timing and amount of lands ceded to the national government from 1781 through 1802 is also 
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documented, with the total being roughly 222 million acres worth about $215 million by 1802. 
The U.S. Federal Government was born land rich and land-asset-value rich. 
The national government’s choices over how to use its lands are addressed next. The 
public, founding fathers, and states all expected the ceded lands to be used to satisfy the debts 
incurred fighting the Revolution. A government budget constraint model linking revenue and 
spending flows with stocks of land assets and debt is developed to show the options available for 
using land assets to service the national debt, i.e. (1) swap all the land at once for as much debt 
as possible or (2) sell the land slowly over time at good prices with the proceeds pledged to 
redeeming debt principal. The first option would have driven land prices down as a result of so 
much land being thrown on the market at once. The Federal Government was solvent when land 
prices were valued at their long-run constant-dollar equilibrium price, but insolvent if valued at 
prices likely to prevail if all the land was dumped on the market at once. In 1790, option 2 
became the founding choice, which in turn helped salvage the government’s credit position. 
Finally, the essay describes the choices made regarding how the land would be sold, i.e. 
lot sizes and shapes, and discusses the economic benefits of these choices. The Land Ordinances 
of 1784, 1785, and 1787 that were carried forward largely intact after the adoption of the 
Constitution are discussed. The choices made in these Ordinances enhanced the value and thus 
the sale price of the land. The rectangular property grid imposed on land buyers rationalized land 
boundaries making property rights more secure. The required purchase of minimum lot sizes far 
larger than the typical farm reduced the cost of surveying and allowed purchasers to capture the 
positive externalities of their initial development efforts. The essay ends with a brief epilogue 
summarizing the results and linking the subsequent Louisiana Purchase in 1803 directly to the 
founding choices made regarding the initial land cessions to the national government.   3
The First Crisis of Disunion: Who Should Get the Spoils of War? 
With George Rogers Clark’s victories over the British in the Ohio territories and the 
pending triumph of the American Revolution, British claims and restrictions over the trans-
Appalachian territories were removed and these lands fell into the hands of the revolutionaries.
2  
This transfer was codified in 1783 with the Treaty of Paris that recognized U.S. sovereign 
independence from Britain, but not without effort and controversy. For example, Spain sought 
surrender of U.S. claims to the eastern Mississippi region and to free navigation of the 
Mississippi River through New Orleans in exchange for aid during the Revolution and trade 
concessions to the Americans, mostly to northern shippers, after the Revolution. These Spanish 
intrigues were fended off by the southern states, effectively stopping northern commercial 
interests and their political allies in Congress from trading away these navigation rights and land 
claims. In addition, U.S. efforts to claim Canadian lands were dropped in the final 1783 treaty.
3 
The new lands acquired in the Treaty of Paris represented a vast territory stretching from 
the Appalachian Mountains to the Mississippi River between the southern shores of the Great 
Lakes and Spanish Florida. What government should get these lands? Initially several states, e.g. 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, claimed 
                                                 
2 Being the victor in the French and Indian War (also called the Seven Year’s War) Britain acquired in 1763 French 
Canada and French claims to the upper Ohio and Mississippi regions—claims that conflicted with those of several 
British colonies such as Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia whose royal charters 
encompassed some of these lands. With the Proclamation of 1763, Britain declared treaties with the Indians in these 
regions made directly by the British superior to any made by the separate American colonies and forbade, with a few 
exceptions, further white incursions into these lands. American colonists worked to evade this proclamation which 
they viewed as an attempt by prominent Englishmen to organize and execute their own land patents in the region. 
Prominent Americans formed land companies and moved to lay claim to these regions. With the 1774 Quebec Act, 
the British also attached the lands west of the Alleghenies and north of the Ohio River to the colony of Quebec for 
administrative purposes and to reaffirm the Proclamation of 1763—in part to counter the American land company 
incursions into these regions (Friedenberg 1992, 104-42; Livermore 1939, 74-122; Sakolski 1932, 1-28). 
3 See Adams (1960, 3: 209-19); Dougherty (2001, 139-40); Friedenberg (1992, 203-12); Henretta et al. (1987, 186, 
218, 228, 231); Jensen (1981, 8-18, 171-3); Journals of the Continental Congress [JCC hereafter] (13: 239-44, 263-
5, 329-30; 14: 955-67; 15: 1084-5; 18: 900-2, 935-47, 1070-1; 19: 151-4; 21: 853-4; 22: 207-8, 219-20; 24: 243-51; 
26: 23-9; 27: 489-9, 529-30, 687-90, 705-6, 616-24; 30: 85-7; 31: 469-84, 509-10, 537-52, 565-70, 574-613; 32: 
184-204, 210, 216-20; 34: 319, 527, 534-5).   4
these lands based on old colonial grants and Indian treaties. Many of these claims were 
overlapping. Other states, e.g. Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Rhode Island, 
and New Hampshire, were hard pressed to make claims to these lands.
4  See Map 1. 
Conflicting land claims created discord among the states. For example, as early as 1775 
Connecticut claims to the Wyoming Valley in Pennsylvania were brought before an otherwise 
busy Continental Congress by Pennsylvania for redress—an issue Congress failed to resolve 
fully even by 1785. Similarly, from 1780 through 1786 a jurisdictional dispute between New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New York was brought before Congress for redress.
5  
Of greater concern were state claims to the trans-Appalachian territories. Many of these 
claims overlapped creating potential discord (see Map 1). In addition, states that did not have 
claims feared that the states that did have such claims, enlarged by these territories, would 
become economically and politically dominant. The sheer size of these enlarged states would 
give them economic power, and any move toward a representative national government based on 
population or land area would give them political dominance. States without western land claims 
brought these concerns to Congress. If a solution could not be found, disunion was likely. 
The Articles of Confederation were drafted and approved by Congress and sent to the 
states for ratification in November of 1777 (JCC 9: 906-28). Ratification, which required 
unanimous consent of the states, was held up until the land issue was resolved. For example, by 
1780 Maryland was still flatly refusing to ratify the Articles of Confederation until this issue was 
solved and solved by the states claiming western lands ceding them to the national government 
for “the general benefit.” The problem of western land claims was viewed in Congress in 1780 as 
                                                 
4 See Donaldson (1884, 30-88); Feller (1984, 3-4); Henretta et al. (1987, 201, 227-8); Jensen (1981, 8-18, 25-6, 44-
5, 64); JCC (6: 946, 1076-9, 1082-3; 17: 806-8; 18: 915-4; 22: 184, 191-4, 223-32; 23: 694-6: 25: 554-64). 
5 See Donaldson (1884, 4, 85); Jensen (1981, 330-6); JCC (3: 321, 335-6, 435, 439-40; 5: 656; 13: 821, 827-8; 20: 
770-2; 21: 823-4, 838-9, 892-3, 1115-6; 22: 57-60, 108-13, 166-73, 186-8, 282-6, 389-92; 23: 461; 24: 7-32; 26: 45, 




Map 1 Western Lands Claimed and then Ceded to the U.S. Federal Government by the 13 
Original States, 1784-1802 
 
Source: Stephenson (1934, 248). For similar maps, see Friedenberg (1992, 199); Henretta et al. (1987, 201); Hughes 
and Cain (2007, 94); and Tindall (1988, 266).  
 
the “only obstacle to final ratification of the articles of confederation.”
6 
States without claims to western lands pressed states with such claims to cede their 
claims to the national government. In 1779 congressmen from Delaware and Maryland asserted 
that the western territories were “gained from the King of Great Britain, or the native Indians, by 
the blood and treasure of all, and ought therefore to be a common estate, to be granted out on 
                                                 
6 See Donaldson (1884, 61-4); Feller (1984, 3-5); Gates (1968, 50-7); Jensen (1981, 8-18, 25-6); JCC (17: 806-8). 
Thereafter, Congress repeatedly called on the states that had not yet completed their lands cessions to do so (JCC 
26: 142-3, 315-7; 33: 692-3).   6
terms beneficial to the United States.” In 1780 congressmen from New York asserted that the 
“…uncultivated territory within the limits or claims of certain States ought to be appropriated as 
a common fund for the expenses of the war....” A congressional committee argued in 1780 that 
these lands were “essential to public credit and confidence…and so necessary to the happy 
establishment of the federal union…” and that they could not “be preserved entire” by the 
claiming states “without endangering the stability of the general confederacy....” Later in 1780, 
Congress resolved that all lands so ceded by the states to the national government “shall be 
disposed of for the common benefit of the United States....”
7  
An important controversy over state land cessions was the status of claims made by land 
speculators to lands north of the Ohio River based on their acquisition of Indian deeds. Many of 
these speculators were prominent individuals from states that had no claims to the western 
territories. Virginia insisted that such claims be voided. Virginia did not want to surrender these 
lands to the general public just to have them fall directly into the hands of prominent New York 
and Philadelphia land speculators. The political battle in Congress between these land 
speculators and Virginia held up the major land cessions until 1784 when Virginia got its way. 
By contrast, speculative land claims by Virginians in Kentucky and by North Carolinians in 
Tennessee were held valid. As such, Kentucky and Tennessee lands never really came under 
alienable Federal possession. These regions were the first two trans-Appalachian states to join 
the union—in 1792 and 1796, respectively. Lastly, Virginia and Connecticut retained sizable 
portions of their cession of Ohio as their “western and military reserves” to satisfy their 
commitments during the Revolution to pay their soldiers in land bounties.
8 
                                                 
7 See Donaldson (1884, 61-4); Gates (1968, 50-7); Jensen (1981, 8-18, 25-6); JCC (17: 806-8). 
8 See Map 2 below; Adams (1960, 3: 214-9); American state papers: Public lands [ASP: PL hereafter] (1: 1, 12, 17, 
112, 164, 193-9, 283); Donaldson (1884, 67-70, 82, 86-7); Feller (1984, 3-5); Friedenberg (1992, 143-221, 248-60, 
275-83); Gates (1968, 50-7); Jensen (1981, 8-18, 25-6, 44-5, 64, 112-4, 171-3, 330-6, 350-9); JCC (17: 806-8; 18:   7
As these conditions were hammered out, states one by one from 1781 through 1802 
ceded their western lands to the national government. The commitment to so cede these lands in 
1781 opened the door to the final ratification, by Maryland, of the Articles of Confederation 
(JCC 19: 208-24). These lands did not come into the alienable possession of the Federal 
Government all at once. It took over two decades to complete the transfer (Donaldson 1884, 30-
88). Table 1 lists the timing and amount of land ceded by the states to the national government. 
Figure 1 shows the cumulative total alienable acres from 1784 to 1802, net of overlapping claims 
and past sales, in the possession of the national government. By the 1787 Constitutional 
Convention, the question of who would possess the spoils of war—the western lands—had been 
settled, though the Georgia cession was yet to be executed. The new national (Federal) 
government representing all the nation’s citizens would own, control, and determine the 
distribution of these lands. It seems unlikely that the Constitution as written in 1787 could have 
been created if not for this prior solution to the problem of western land claims. 
The shift in the sectional balance of power between the southern, middle, and 
northeastern states that would have likely breached the union in the early decades of the 
Republic (if, for example, states like Virginia were allowed to retain their western lands) was 
averted by the cession of these lands to the national government. The sectional conflict within 
the national government was shifted to competition over the admission of new states carved out 
of these territories—a peaceful though spirited competition that would only devolve into a 
breach in the union some 70 years later. 
Between 1784 and 1802, the national government acquired a treasure trove of assets 
amounting to 220 million acres of potentially salable land lying between the Mississippi River, 
                                                                                                                                                             
914-6; 21: 1057-8, 1076-8; 22: 184, 191-4, 223-32; 25: 554-64; 26: 110-7; 28: 234-6; 34: 133, 270-1, 331-4, 476); 
Livermore (1939, 74-122); Sakolski (1932, 1-123); Tindall (1988, 268). Negotiations over the future status of 
Kentucky and Tennessee as separate states also slowed the Virginia and North Carolina land cessions.   8
Table 1   Land Cessions to the Federal Government by the 13 Original States, 1781-1802 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Year  State             Acres    Notes 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1781  New York           202,187    jointly claimed by Massachusetts 
 
1784  Virginia    229,917,493    some acres jointly claimed by other states,  
       excludes  Kentucky,  and  includes  lands   
       reserved  in  Ohio  to  Virginia 
 
1785  Massachusetts     34,560,000    jointly claimed by other states 
 
1786  Connecticut      25,600,000    jointly claimed by other states, but with 
       3,800,000  of  Ohio  held  back  as  a  reserve 
 
1787  South Carolina      3,136,000    solely claimed 
 
1790  North Carolina    26,679,600    mostly Tennessee which had already been 
alienated and so is typically not counted 
 
1802  Georgia      56,689,920    solely claimed 
 
Gross Total    376,785,200   simple  sum 
 
Net Total Ceded    221,989,787    minus overlapping claims, the North 
To the National      Carolina  cession,  and  Virginia  and 
Government         Connecticut  reserve  lands  in  Ohio   
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Sources: Map 1; ASP: PL (1: 1, 12, 17, 112, 164, 193-9); Donaldson (1884, 11, 86-8); Gates (1968, 57); Grubb 
(2007b, 146-7); Hibbard (1939, 13); Historical Statistics (1975, 1: 428); JCC (19: 208-13; 26: 110-7; 28: 271-5, 
280-4, 382-7, 408-10; 30: 159-60, 307-8, 310-11; 31: 654-5; 33: 466-77; 34: 320-6). 
 
Notes: The Net Total is not consistently estimated across the sources see Grubb (2007b, 147). 
 
the Great Lakes, Florida, and the current western borders of the original 13 states (see Map 1). 
Congress adopted the Constitution in 1789, replacing the Articles of Confederation with this new 
government. The new Constitution reaffirmed congressional control over the ceded western 
lands. Article IV, section 3, paragraph 2 of the Constitution stated, “The Congress shall have 
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other 
property belonging to the United States…” The Supreme Court would later determine that this   9
 
Figure 1   Total and Net (Total minus Sales) Accumulated Salable Acres Possessed by the 
Federal Government 
 
Source: Derived from Grubb (2007b, 146-7).  
 
power vested in Congress was without limitation. (Donaldson 1884, 13; Gates 1968, 73-4)  The 
new Federal Government was born land rich! 
What Was the Value of These Federally Owned Land Assets? 
Establishing the total asset value of the lands held by the Federal Government matters 
because these lands were to be used in some fashion to pay off or back the debts incurred   10
fighting the Revolution, which amounted to $80 million in interest-bearing bonds in 1792. To do 
this an average price per acre of the public domain held by the Federal Government is needed. 
This is hard to come by as land is very heterogeneous and sales in this period were small and 
sometimes selective—meaning possibly unrepresentative. Given a true average nominal price, 
that price still has to be adjusted for inflation and deflation. Between 1784 and 1802, prices 
experienced large swings so that comparing values over time cannot be done in just nominal or 
current prices (Bezanson et al. 1936, 392-3; Grubb 2003, 1782-3). Given a true inflation-adjusted 
constant dollar average price of an acre, consideration must also be given to what might happen 
to that price if the Federal Government tried to sell all its land at once versus trying to sell it 
slowly over time. The Federal Government was such a large holder of land that trying to sell a 
substantial amount at once would likely depress the price. Given these formidable problems, 
presenting a range of estimates based on some likely average prices is the best that can be done. 
Figure 2 presents four estimates of the value of the net salable public domain in the hands 
of the Federal Government in constant dollars over time. Each estimate is based on a different 
average nominal price for an acre of land that was reported in a different year. Because land is 
extremely heterogeneous, only the sale or pricing of reasonably large tracts can give some 
reassurance that the average price observed is close to a true average price. Only one estimate in 
Figure 2 uses an actual sale price from the period while the other three use official published 
prices, two set by Congress and one proposed by the Treasury Secretary, Alexander Hamilton. 
Land had to be surveyed before being sold at public auction. Surveying and selling the 
public domain, including administration expenses, cost between three and six cents an acre. 
These costs were to be paid by the purchaser. Fees for application, registration, and patenting of 
land were around half a cent an acre and were also to be paid by the purchaser (Donaldson 1884,    11
 
Figure 2   Constant Dollar Value of Salable Federal Government Land Assets, 1784-1802: 
Various Estimates 
 
Source: Derived from Grubb (2007b, 148-51). 
 
Notes: The estimates multiply the total acres of salable public domain remaining in the Federal Government’s 
possession each year from Figure 1 by the nominal price per acre for the year that the respective nominal price was 
mentioned. From the year when the nominal price was stated, each estimate then inflation-adjusts the price to other 
years using the Bezanson et al. (1936, 392-3) price index renormalized to the year the nominal price was given. 
 
189-90, 192, 197, 201-2).
9 
                                                 
9 Carstensen (1963, xviii) and Hughes and Cain (2007, 98-9) indicate that the cost of acquiring, surveying, and 
selling the land exceeded the revenue received from land sales. Their source is Donaldson (1884, 17-21, 517-27). 
However, Donaldson’s estimates show that this assessment arises from decisions made post-1830 to purchase new 
lands and especially to increase spending on Indian affairs (around 85 percent of the total cost) while at the same   12
The official minimum price set by Congress (which was not strictly adhered to) for 
purchasing the public domain which had to be purchased in large tracts—a minimum purchase of 
a 640 acre lot—was $1.00 per acre in 1785 and raised to $2.00 per acre in 1796 (Davis et al. 
1972, 104-5; Donaldson 1884, 196-8; Robbins 1942, 15-6). If these prices are inflation adjusted 
from the year they were enacted, they are almost equal at $1.00 per acre in 1785 dollars.
10  In 
1781, Pelatiah Webster (1969, 93) also placed the average value at one silver dollar per acre. The 
time series of real prices based on the nominal $2.00 per acre enacted in 1796 yields the highest 
overall price series among the official prices enacted by Congress.
11 
The fact that total land sales were not large through 1802 (see Figure 1) suggests that 
these official prices may be on the high side of the true value of the public domain. The slowness 
of sales early on, however, may also have been due to the need to survey the lands before they 
could be put up for auction and the slowness of such surveying (the basic survey scheme not 
being fully established until the Land Acts of 1796 and 1800) and to several states having 
retained significant western and northern lands outbidding the Federal Government for settlers 
by pricing their lands just under that set by the Federal Government for the public domain. In 
addition, the difficulty of achieving unison of action under the Articles of Confederation 
inhibited Congress’ ability to adequately curb Indian hostilities in the West, stop squatters from 
occupying the public domain, dislodge the remaining British in the northern territories, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
time revenues from land sales were reduced via giving land away to railroads and homesteaders. The cost of 
surveying and selling the land was a trivial component by comparison. Pre-1830, and especially pre-1813, virtually 
all the value of its original cession lands was captured by the U.S. when sold. For example, spending on Indian 
affairs pre-1813 amounted to less than one cent, and pre-1830 to about one cent, per acre of the public domain. 
10 Interestingly, the sale of the Chickasaw Trust Lands in the central Southern states from 1836 through 1850 
(4,025,395 acres for $3,326,404) yields an average nominal price of $0.83 an acre which when deflation-adjusted 
back to 1785 would be approximately $1.00 an acre (Gates 1968, 186; Bezanson et al. 1936, 392). Similarly, the 
bounty warrants for land given as compensation to veterans of the Revolution, War of 1812, and Mexican-American 
War when thrown onto the land market between 1848 and 1853 by these recipients for whatever cash they could get 
sold for an average of $0.85 an acre (Lebergott 1985, 199-200). 
11 Under the credit payment system inaugurated in 1800 the U.S. sold through 1813 a total of 4,520,933 acres and 
received $7,316,615 in actual cash or $1.62 an acre with $2,114,136 still owed, see Feller (1984, 12). Deflated back 
from 1813, $1.62 an acre in 1813 is the same as $1.01 an acre in 1785 (Bezanson et al. 1936, 392).    13
prevent Spanish blockades of the Mississippi River in the South. These inabilities may have in 
turn depressed the value of western lands until these weaknesses in the Federal Government were 
remedied by the adoption of the Constitution in 1789. To be conservative, the 1785 price of 
$1.00 per acre or the 1796 price of $2.00 per acre (inflation-adjusted) will be used here only to 
illustrate a possible upper-range-estimate of the value of the public domain.
12 
The lowest price series based on a large actual sale of the public domain and used here in 
Figure 2 as the best-guess estimate of the value of the public domain is for the Erie Triangle land 
transfer to Pennsylvania in 1792—202,187 acres for $151,640 or an average price of $0.75 an 
acre. In the same inflation-adjusted range is the average price of all public domain sold prior to 
1800 (1,281,860 acres for $1,050,085, i.e. $0.82 an acre), the 23 July 1787 act that temporarily 
reduced the minimum price to $0.67 an acre, and the proposed one million acre sale of Ohio 
territory to John Cleve Symmes in 1788 at $0.67 an acre (Map 2 below; Donaldson 1884, 17, 
197-8; Hibbard 1939, 51, 55, 100; JCC 34: 480; Rutland 1977, 10: 218). The 1792 estimate of 
$0.75 an acre (inflation-adjusted) yields a total value for the public domain in the Federal 
Government’s possession in 1802 (after the Georgia land cession) of $215 million dollars.
13 
This best-guess estimate is surprisingly close to contemporary guesses. In an essay 
                                                 
12 See Adams (1960, 3: 155); ASP: PL (1: 72-3); Davis et al. (1972, 102-3); Donaldson (1884, 189-90, 197, 201); 
Dougherty (2001, 175); Feller (1984, 9-10); Gates (1968, 128); Henretta et al. (1987, 221-4); Hibbard (1939, 41); 
Hughes and Cain (2007, 95-6); Jensen (1981, 414); JCC (30: 230-1, 262; 31: 685-6; 32: 213, 231, 238-41; 34: 331); 
Puls (2008, 200, 246); Robbins (1942, 9); and Map 2 below. A 13 February 1786 congressional report noted “with 
great satisfaction, the prospect of extinguishing a part of the domestic Debt, by sale of the western Territory of the 
United States; but [that] a considerable Time must elapse before that Country can be surveyed and disposed of…” 
(JCC 30: 65). In 1788 Congress budgeted $4,000 for surveying western lands and $20,000 for Indian treaties—to 
extinguish Indian land claims. By comparison, $228,427 was budgeted for the Civil and Military Departments, 
$58,000 for invalid pensions, and $16,000 for contingencies (JCC 34: 389, 438). When lands did finally go up for 
auction some claim that they were worth more than the minimum price set by the government but that collusion 
among the bidders prevented prices from being offered that were above the minimum (Lebergott 1985, 199). 
13 Pennsylvania paid for the Erie Triangle with U.S. public securities, a mixture of 6 percent, 3 percent, and deferred 
bonds, all taken at face value (par). Albert Gallatin rated the 6 percent bonds at par, but the 3 percent and deferred 
bonds at 60 and 75 percent of par, respectively (Adams 1960, 100, 197). Using these discounts the total paid was 
$119,268 or $0.59 an acre. Inflation-adjusted to 1802 this yields a total value for the public domain of $177 million. 
Gallatin’s assessment, however, is arbitrage inconsistent and so the adjusted values should be used with caution.     14
published in Philadelphia 25 April 1781 (republished there in 1791) Pelatiah Webster (1969, 
493, 497) claimed the government had about 200 million acres of good land that could be sold 
and valued it at about one silver dollar per acre on average. He also did not think that the “profit 
from our western lands, when disposed of according to my plan, so very distant as many may 
imagine.” In 1789 Jedidiah Morse, the “father of American geography,” estimated that Congress 
had 220 million acres of “unappropriated western territory” to dispose of which had been 
“pledged as a fund for sinking the continental debt.” (Jensen 1981, 111; Morse 1792, 35) 
Lastly, in part for heuristic purposes, a low estimate of $0.30 an acre is also reported in 
Figure 2. This price does not come from an actual sale, but is the price that Alexander Hamilton, 
as Secretary of the Treasury, proposed for extinguishing some of the principal of the national 
debt by swapping it for western lands in his “Report on Vacant Lands” sent to Congress 22 July 
1790. Hamilton also mentioned a price of $0.20 an acre in his January 1790 “Report on Public 
Credit” (ASP: PL, 1: 1-5; Donaldson 1884, 198-9; Syrett 1962, 6: 90-1, 504). The logic Hamilton 
used to deduce these prices, however, is arbitrage inconsistent.
14  Assuming Hamilton was not 
stupid implies that his price estimates meant something else or were intended to achieve some 
                                                 
14 Hamilton combined two observations to deduce his land price (Syrett 1962, 6: 91). First, the public domain had 
been sold for $1.00 an acre which could be paid either in specie or in public debt at its face value. Second, the public 
debt had been trading for $0.20 to $0.30 specie per dollar of face value in the mid-1780s because it was in de facto 
default. Thus, Hamilton deduced that an acre of land was worth in specie $0.20 to $0.30 and not $1.00. This 
deduction, however, is arbitrage inconsistent if specie and public debt at face value were both used to buy land—
which apparently they were, see ASP: PL (1: 73); Donaldson (1884, 17, 201); Hibbard (1939, 41). Either anyone 
paying specie for land at $1.00 an acre was a fool or anyone selling their public debt for $0.30 of specie per dollar of 
value was a fool. Hamilton’s logic also ignores the appreciation effect that substantial land-for-debt sales would 
have on the market price of debt. The Massachusetts Centinel, 19 May 1787, reasoned that substantial land sales 
“must give an immediate rise to the current value of the securities of the United States, which are received in 
payment for lands as specie.” Jensen (1981, 384) concluded, “…it was the unsettled land of the United States that 
seemed the best justification for speculation in American [war] debt.” However, very few land sales, whether paid 
for in specie or in securities, were consummated before 1790. Little of the national debt, only about 1 percent of the 
interest-bearing debt, was actually pledged to be swapped for land by 1789 with most of these swaps not 
consummated until the early 1790s. These pre-1790 sales were restricted mostly to large negotiated swaps between 
Congress and land companies and not generally open to small purchasers at auction in a competitive venue (Grubb 
2007a, 281; Donaldson 1884, 197-9, 201; Gates 1968, 69-71; Hibbard 1939, 41-55; Jensen 1981, 354-9; JCC 34: 
371-3, 565-6). Land sales did not get the chance to drive security prices up to par before the 4 August 1790 Funding 
Act solved the security-funding problem causing their prices to re-inflate to face value. In conclusion, something is 
not right with Hamilton’s logic and his land price estimates should be used with caution (Grubb 2007b, 150).   15
other political purpose than simply reporting the true expected long-run equilibrium average 
constant-dollar price of an acre of public domain. Hamilton’s rhetorical argumentation often has 
such a disingenuous tone that it is difficult to grasp its true meaning (Ratchford 1941, 52).  
While not directly mentioned by Hamilton in his reports, one interpretation of what his 
$0.30 an acre estimate really measures can be derived from the fact that in his reports he was 
talking about the possibility of selling or swapping most or all of the public domain at once to 
extinguish the national debt. Such a large sale or transfer of land in a short time interval would 
depress its market price. Thus, Hamilton’s $0.30 an acre could represent a guess about what 
would happen to the price of land if the Federal Government tried to unload all its land too 
quickly. Trying to gauge the effect on the market price of such a massive land dump is difficult, 
and Hamilton’s estimate, as shown in Figure 2, will be taken here as a best guess of this.
15 
Given the estimates in Figure 2, how dollar-asset land rich was the Federal Government? 
The national debt between 1792 and 1802 hovered around $80 million and tax revenues per year 
ranged between $4 and $15 million (Gordon 1998, 206; Grubb 2007a, 281; Historical Statistics 
1975, 2: 1104). Using the Erie Triangle estimate (inflation-adjusted and securities discounted), 
the value of the public domain in the possession of the Federal Government was over $95 million 
in 1786 and over $147 million in 1796. The Federal Government was not just born land rich, it 
was born dollar-asset rich! Paul Wallace Gates concluded (1968, 56), “The transfer of these 
territories probably did more than anything else at the time to give prestige to the government.” 
 
                                                 
15 The effect of throwing such a large amount of land onto the market at once might be gauged from what happened 
with the Bounty Act of 1847 which awarded land warrants to war veterans amounting to about 68 million acres of 
the public domain. About 85 percent of these bounty warrants were thrown onto the market in exchange for cash 
between 1848 and 1853. These land warrants ended up trading at about $0.85 per acre. The government’s minimum 
price per acre at that time was $1.25. As such, the effective market price was about two-thirds of the minimum 
government price for an acre of the public domain (Lebergott 1985, 199-200). By analogy, throwing all the public 
domain onto the market at once in 1790, about 164 million acres at that time, could well have depressed the price in 
the marketplace to well over a third below the minimum price set by the government.   16
What Should Be Done With These Federally Owned Land Assets? 
States considered the lands they had ceded to the national government were to be used to 
satisfy the debts incurred to gain independence. This was the prominent theme in the 
congressional debates over ceding western lands to the national government, and after 1780 
Congress continued to link its ceded land assets with the national debt (Donaldson 1884, 60-81; 
Gates 1968, 61-2, 124; Jensen 1981, 58). For example, on 5 September 1782 a congressional 
committee favored “ceding of the western lands, to be sold to ‘discharge the national debt.’” 
(Hibbard 1939, 33)  A 1786 congressional report recommended that, “The whole product [from 
sales of western lands]…is [to be] appropriated for the payment of the principal and interest of 
the national debt, and no part thereof can be diverted to other purposes.” (JCC 30: 65)   
Prominent founding fathers echoed this theme. In a letter to Nathaniel Chipman, 22 July 
1788, dealing with how the national war debt might affect Vermont tax-wise if it joined the 
union, Alexander Hamilton, said, “The public debt, as far as it can prudently be provided for, 
will be by the Western lands and the appropriation of some general fund.” (Syrett 1962, 5: 186)  
In a 19 June 1788 letter to Marquis de Lafayette, George Washington remarked, “When the 
people find…the burdens of war shall be in a manner done away by the sale of western 
lands…these blessings will be referred to the fostering influence of the new government. 
Whereas many causes will have conspired to produce them.” (Fitzpatrick 1939, 29: 522-6) 
 In the 1780s the expectations of both the public and among the founding fathers, as well 
as the political mandates accompanying the land transfers from the states, were that the lands so 
transferred to the Federal Government were to be used to pay for the cost of the War for 
Independence (Feller 1984, 6; Jensen 1981, 246, 359, 384). But exactly how this should be done 
was not made clear. What choices existed for satisfying such expectations and mandates?   17
How are a Government’s Debts and (Land) Assets Related: What Choices Are There? 
A government’s debts and (land) assets are related through its budget constraint which 
connects its cash flows to its capital stocks. The government’s yearly tax revenue (Ti) minus its 
yearly expenditures (Gi) must equal the change in its stock of net capital assets (Ai - Di), where 
A are salable capital assets—e.g. inventories of specie, bank stock, and land, and D are the face 
value of its debt liabilities—principally callable perpetuities with the principal payable only at 
the government’s discretion for the U.S. after 1790.
16 
Ti [(t * Ii)  +  Oi]   -   Gi [((1 – ki)*Rg*Di)  +  Ei]    =   ∆(Ai  -  Di) 
For the Federal Government after 1790 the principal tax revenue (Ti) came from a tariff 
(t) on current imports (Ii), with Oi representing all other current-year tax revenues such as from 
the whiskey tax. Yearly expenditures (Gi) comprised the interest the Federal Government owed 
on the face value of its current stock of interest-bearing debt (Rg * Di) that it does not default on 
(1 - ki), where ki is the default rate (0 ≤ ki ≤ 1), with Ei representing all other current-year 
expenditures, such as military expenditures. 
  When the government has a budget surplus [Ti – Gi > 0] it has excess revenue and, 
assuming that it is not in default on its interest payments (i.e. that ki = 0), it must either increase 
its stock of assets [Ai + 1 > Ai] and/or pay down and retire some of the principal on its debt [Di + 1 
< Di]. When the government has a budget deficit [Ti – Gi < 0] then the shortfall in revenue must 
be covered either by selling some assets [Ai + 1 < Ai] and/or borrowing more [Di + 1 > Di] and/or 
                                                 
16 Debt liabilities (D) include both interest-bearing bonds (B) and non-interest-bearing fiat paper money (M), i.e. D 
= B + M. The Federal Government did not issue new M after 1779 and the new U.S. Constitution, by convention 
vote in 1787, prohibited the Federal Government from issuing new M thereafter (Farrand 1996, 2: 308-10; Grubb 
2006a, 43-4, 60-2). As such, only the B portion of D factors into G. Paying down or retiring any of the face value of 
the principal, either of B or M, without liquidating assets, however, would still require a current-year budget surplus 
(T – G > 0). As part of the debt restructuring plan of 1790, the Federal Government effectively and irrevocably 
defaulted on the remaining M issued prior to 1780 that was still outstanding in 1790 (Grubb 2007a). As such, 
distinguishing between B and M in the model is not necessary.   18
increasing its default on its interest payments (ki + 1 > ki). If an important goal of the government 
is to protect its creditworthiness by keeping ki = 0, then increasing k is not an option but a last 
resort. If the government has no assets (A) then it has to increase its debt liabilities (D). 
However, increasing D via interest-bearing liabilities raises G in the future [(Rg * Di + 1) > (Rg * 
Di)] which puts increased pressure on the budget to stay in deficit [Ti + 1 – Gi + 1 < 0], particularly 
given that in this period the Federal Government’s ability to raise taxes in the near future was 
tightly constrained, i.e. it is likely that per capita Ti ≥ Ti + n. This scenario puts the government in 
an unsustainable long-run position, putting pressure on the government to increase k, i.e. to 
default in the near future (Taylor 1950, 5). This pressure on future k would be incorporated into 
current expectations and so lead to an increase in Rg today thus further constraining the 
government’s ability to escape its current budget deficit anytime soon and further increasing the 
likelihood of a near-future default.   
  This last scenario fits the United States in the late 1780s as James Madison explained it to 
Thomas Jefferson on 24 October 1787,  
Such is the state & prospect of our fiscal department that any new loan however  
small, that should now be made, would probably subject us to the reproach of  
premeditated deception. The balance of Mr. Adams’ last loan will be wanted for  
the interest due in Holland, and with all the income here, will, it is feared, not  
save our credit in Europe from further wounds. It may well be doubted whether  
the present Govt. can be kept alive thro’ the ensuing year, or untill the new one  
may take its place. (Rutland 1977, 10: 218; Swanson 1963, 36)   
 
As such, the government’s net asset position (Ai – Di) should be an important factor in 
assessing its creditworthiness and for resolving any budget deficit problems. A positive net asset 
position functions as a safety valve that could potentially relieve the pressure to default when the 
budget unexpectedly falls into deficit. It is not the actual current revenue or contemporaneous 
cash flow from the sale of A that matters to assessing the government’s creditworthiness but A’s   19
potential salability to cover or back the government’s current and future debt position. As a 
sovereign entity the Federal Government could not be forced to liquidate its assets to pay off its 
debts when in default like a private business. Nevertheless, default is costly to sovereign entities 
in terms of lost reputation, a lowered credit rating, and reduced access to borrowing in the 
future—a cost that the sale of capital assets could avert. 
  Between 1781 and 1790 the U.S. Federal Government made almost no interest or 
principal payments on the domestic portion of its debt (Taylor 1950, 2). In effect, k = 1 over the 
recent past so that even when the Federal Government started paying interest in full (k = 0) after 
1790, its reputation for paying the interest on its debt would likely not fully recover until 
sometime after 1790—until after it had established a firm track record for always meeting 
interest payments. Expected budget surpluses did not look promising even after 1790—even 
after the new Constitution gave the Federal Government an independent power to levy taxes 
directly on the public (Taylor 1950, 5). The government’s revenue expectations were in doubt 
given its inability to prevent smuggling and enforce tariff (t) payments; in doubt given 
fluctuations in tariff revenues (the main source of tax revenue) due to ubiquitous fluctuations in 
foreign trade (Ii); and in doubt given questions about the government’s ability to raise other taxes 
(Oi) considering the public’s willingness to engage in violent large-scale tax revolts, e.g. Shay’s 
Rebellion 1786-7, the Whiskey Rebellion 1794, and Fries’ Rebellion 1798.
17 
All three rebellions were tax revolts that involved calling out the regular army on a 
substantial scale to confront its own citizens. The Whiskey Rebellion witnessed the only time a 
sitting U.S. President as commander-in-chief has taken the field at the head of an army. The 
founding fathers were aware that public resistance was a constraint on raising new taxes. In late 
                                                 
17 See Bouton (1996); Dougherty (2001, 103-28); Edling and Kaplanoff (2004); Richards (2002); Syrett (1972, 17: 
2-6, 9-58, 61-72, 77-8); Szatmary (1980); Tindall (1988, 320-1, 333-4).   20
1789 James Madison, Congressman from Virginia, wrote to Alexander Hamilton, the Secretary 
of the Treasury, that, “In my opinion, in considering plans for the increase of our revenue, the 
difficulty lies, not so much in the want of objects as in the prejudices which may be feared with 
regard to almost every object. The Question is very much What further taxes will be least 
unpopular?” (Syrett 1962, 5: 439)  
Hamilton may have also doubted the government’s ability to raise enough revenue to 
meet expenses. In late 1789 as Secretary of the Treasury he broached the possibility of quietly 
approaching the French to see “…if the installments of the Principal of the debt [the U.S. owed 
France] could be suspended for a few years, [as] it would be a valuable accommodation to the 
U.S.” (Syrett 1962, 5: 426, 429)  Letters between Hamilton, as Secretary of the Treasury 
overseeing the tariff revenue tax, and his port agents often alluded to the problem of smuggling, 
the difficulty of enforcing the tariff, and the difficulty of collecting tariff revenues. As one 
customs officer put it in late 1789, “The difficulties that have occurred in the Execution of the 
laws respecting the Customs have been infinite, and present themselves daily. The System itself 
is the most complicated and embarrassing of anything that has employed my attention…[and] the 
Owners pay with reluctance…others not at all without compulsion; and the law provides none.” 
(Syrett 1962, 5: 422, 427, 459-64; 1972, 17: 6-7)  
The first full year of tariff revenues, 1 October 1789 through 30 September 1790, yielded 
$1,903,709. This sum was less than half of what was needed to pay the interest on the nation’s 
$77 million interest-bearing debt, let alone meet any other expenses of government (Syrett 1962, 
6: 87; 1965, 9: 3). Hamilton expected revenue shortfalls from the tariff to continue and suggested 
new taxes, such as the Whiskey Tax. This in turn sparked the 1794 Whiskey Rebellion (Tindall 
1988, 301, 320; Syrett 1963, 7: 225-36). The yearly value of imports fluctuated greatly between   21
1789 and 1811 making tariff revenues uncertain and difficult to forecast (North 1966, 19-32, 
228). This was due in part to the problem the U.S. had, as a new nation, establishing trade 
treaties with foreign powers (Tindall 1988, 316-8, 330-1). In 1786 James Madison decried 
“…the present anarchy of our commerce…” and Hamilton expressed a similar sentiment in 1794 
in a letter to President Washington (Rutland 1973, 8: 502-3; Syrett 1972, 16: 261-79). The next 
Secretary of the Treasury, Oliver Wolcott, in his communication to Congress on 14 December 
1796 regarding implementing new direct taxes, recounted the past volatility and future 
uncertainty of tariff revenues which were in part due to the unpredictable course of European 
wars (Wolcott 1796). Albert Gallatin, who would be Secretary of the Treasury under Thomas 
Jefferson, reached a similar conclusion in 1796 regarding past and expected future deficits and 
the risk of constantly covering such through new loans (Adams 1960, 3: 100-1, 105). 
The annual Federal budget actually incurred deficits between $1.4 and $2.1 million in 
1792, 1794-5, and 1799, and came close to being in deficit in 1793, 1798, and 1800 (Gordon 
1998, 206; Historical Statistics 1975, 2: 1104). These deficits were not unanticipated. Creditors 
had to be concerned about the effects these deficits would have on the Federal Government’s 
ability to meet its future debt obligations purely from current tax revenues. As such, the net asset 
position of the Federal Government (Ai – Di) in this period may have been especially important 
to establishing and sustaining the government’s creditworthiness. A positive net asset position 
would have been viewed as a safety valve to the pressure of increasing k to balance budget 
shortfalls in a world where the government’s yearly tax revenue capacity was still in doubt.  
But How Should the Public Domain Be Used to Support the National Debt? 
The budget constraint model above suggests that there were two basic options for using 
the public domain to support the national debt. The first option would be to sell or swap land (A)   22
for debt (D) as quickly as possible thereby reducing D to zero or as close to zero as possible. 
This would take pressure off the budget by reducing the current yearly expenditure of (Gi) by 
reducing (Rg * Di). In essence this would be like starting with a clean slate by clearing the books 
of as much old war debt as possible. The second option would be only to sell the land (A) when a 
good price could be had to pay down D and in the meantime hold the land in reserve as backing 
for D—a safety valve for when yearly tax revenues might fall short and meeting the interest 
payments on D purely out of current revenues was in doubt. Gallatin articulated these two 
options in his Sketch of the Finance in 1796 (Adams 1960, 3: 155-6). 
a. Option One: 
Between 1784 and 1790, there was much discussion and some plans, both executed and 
yet to be executed, to sell or swap the public domain for national government debt (A for D). The 
idea of liquidating war debts via land transfers was not strange. For example, one essayist argued 
in the Salem Gazette, reprinted in the Pennsylvania Gazette, 22 June 1785, “Our national debt is 
small, our resources almost untouched, and our means of discharging it,...nearly inexhaustible… 
The sale of vacant lands, the property of the continent or state, should not be strained for the 
highest price, but be immediately sold for the most they would readily bring.” (Jensen 1981, 246)  
In the state cessions of lands to the national government, some states reserved lands for paying 
their soldiers and war debts, e.g. Virginia and Connecticut held on to sizable chunks of Ohio as 
their “western and military reserve” lands, see Map 2. Congress itself had offered land bounties 
to soldiers as inducements to enlist during the Revolution. In addition, land companies sought to 
acquire large yet-to-be-surveyed tracts of the public domain in part hoping to exchange war debt 
obligations for said lands. In 1787 the Ohio Company offered to purchase one and one-half 




Map 2   Example of Lands Not Ceded to the Federal Government But Retained by the States, 
Plus Some Early Prospective Land Sales, Grants, and Reserves, in the Ohio Territory 
 
Source: Hibbard (1939, 53). See a similar map in Sakolski (1932, 100). 
 
 
Congress. In 1788 Judge John Cleves Symmes made a similar offer for two million acres 
between the Great and Little Miami Rivers, see Map 2. Exchanging or selling land for war debt   24
was a prominent theme and seen by many as the solution to the national government’s financial 
distress. Merrill Jensen (1981, 384) concluded, “…it was the unsettled land of the United States 
that seemed the best justification for speculation in American [war] debt.”
18 
The founding fathers were aware of and talked about these possibilities. For example, on 
23 October 1787, Edward Carrington wrote to Thomas Jefferson, who was in Paris at the time, in 
reference to the land sale schemes just mentioned, 
This mode of sale will relieve the U.S. of much expense, and the progress of the sales 
promise to be sufficiently rapid to give our people early relief from the pressure of the 
domestic debt. I am inclined to believe that some successful experiment might be made 
for the sale [of] a part of the territory in Europe, and have suggested a trial with a few 
Ranges of the surveyed Townships. (Boyd 1955, 12: 256-7) 
 
James Madison wrote to Jefferson on 24 October 1787 on the same issue and, after talking about 
the woeful state of national government finances and borrowing prospects, said, 
Upwards of 100,000 Acres of the surveyed lands of the U.S. have been disposed of in 
open market. Five million of unsurveyed have been sold by private contract to a N. 
England Company, at 2/3 of a dollar per acre, payment to be made in the principal of the 
public securities. A negotiation is nearly closed with a N. Jersey Company for two 
million more on like terms, and another commenced with a Company of this City for four 
million. (Rutland 1977, 10: 218)
19 
 
William Findley, congressman from Pennsylvania, claimed that proposals for large sales 
of the public domain were still being made in 1790. He said that,  
Flint and Parker had agreed to purchase three millions of acres. To the second session of 
the New Congress, Scriba made proposals for four or five millions. And Hannibal 
William Dobbyne proposed to take more than all the others, and to settle it with people 
from Ireland. These proposals were referred to the secretary of the treasury [Hamilton], 
while he was privately preparing the funding system: but he never reported on them….If 
the proposals of Messrs. Parker, Dobbyne, and others, which were offered before the 
funding system was originated, had been accepted, it is a moderate computation to 
                                                 
18 See Adams (1960, 3: 221); Donaldson (1884, 17, 82-5); Friedenberg (1992); Gates (1968, 62, 70-1); Hibbard 
(1939, 10-4, 44-55); Jensen (1981, 32, 352-6, 359, 384-5); JCC (6: 946; 17: 808; 25: 681-94; 32: 155-7, 242-3, 276, 
345-6, 350-1, 376-7; 33: 692-7, 701-2; 34: 80-1, 177, 181-2, 213-7, 247-2, 331-4, 371-3, 467-8, 473-4, 476, 540-2, 
565-6); Livermore (1939, 74-214); Robbins (1942, 10-1); Sakolski (1932, 1-191); Sumner (1968, 2: 251-70). 
19 Of the last three sales mentioned, the first two were only partially executed and not paid for until after 1792 and 
the last sale failed to be executed, see ASP: PL (1: 59-60, 63, 66-8, 73, 115, 236-7); Donaldson (1884, 17, 201); 
Hibbard (1939, 43-55); Livermore (1939, 134-46).   25
suppose that fifteen millions of dollars would have been redeemed. (Taylor 1950, 62) 
  
Hamilton, himself, in his 1790 “Report on Public Credit” proposed one plan whereby a full third 
of the national debt would be extinguished by swapping it for land (Syrett 1962, 6: 91-2). 
  The problem with this option—to sell all the land as quickly as possible to reduce D by as 
much as possible—was that dumping a lot of land on the market at once would likely reduce its 
price significantly. At $0.75 an acre in 1790, or even at $0.50 an acre, there was enough land to 
completely pay off the interest-bearing debt, but if the price was driven down to Hamilton’s 
proposed $0.30 an acre there was not enough so that afterwards A = 0 but D > 0 (Grubb 2007a, 
280-4).
20  Under such an outcome there would be no asset cushion or safety valve for the Federal 
Government to fall back on in case its current budget fell into deficit, which as explained above 
was not an unlikely or unexpected possibility. In such an event the government would be forced 
to increase D to meet the shortfall, which as explained above was an unsustainable long-run 
position as increasing D increased future G. This would likely worry creditors in that the 
government’s future creditworthiness might come into question which would in turn raise R thus 
also increasing future G, or even cause the government to lose access to borrowing in the near 
future.
21  The potential for the government’s creditworthiness to unravel after such a liquidation 
(swapping or selling all its land to liquidate as much of its debt as possible) would seem high. In 
addition, if the Federal Government sold all of its lands at once it would lose leverage over 
populations in the territories regarding issues of local governance and new state formation.  
                                                 
20 In 1790, if all the public domain was exchanged for interest-bearing public debt at $0.30 per acre that would still 
leave D = $28 million ($77 million in debt [D] minus $49 million in land [A]). Such a move would also mean that 
the Federal Government may have had a harder time distinguishing between interest-bearing debt ($77 million in 
face value in 1790) and non-interest bearing debt (another $81 million in face value in 1790). Directly swapping 
land (A) for debt principal (D) makes the interest-bearing distinction between types of D irrelevant. As such the 
government would have found it harder to default with impunity on its non-interest bearing debt in 1790 (the 
Continental Dollars still outstanding) as they in fact successfully did. See Grubb (2007a, 280-4). 
21 The founding fathers did not articulate such directly or clearly. This is an analytical conclusion not one based on 
positions clearly articulated by actors at the time, but one that seems consistent with the history and behavior of the 
parties involved. See also Henretta et al. (1987, 210-2).   26
b. Option Two: 
If the public domain could be pledged to back the national debt only, i.e. held in reserve 
to meet budget deficit emergencies only—with the interest on the national debt paid out of 
current revenues, and the public domain only sold slowly over time at good prices with these 
proceeds dedicated to retiring debt principal, then the creditworthiness of the Federal 
Government might be more safely ensured. The basic idea was not strange. The linkage of land 
assets to the “backing” of public financial instruments was deeply rooted in the American 
experience. Colonial governments formed land banks where a subject’s land served as collateral 
for loans of government paper money. A colony’s paper bills of credit were understood to be 
backed or collateralized not by specie but by the mortgaged land assets of the colony.
22  
Financiers understood the importance of a “pledge” of security by the government to the 
backing of its debts to foster public confidence in its debt position. For example, William 
Bingham, a director of the Bank of North America, in a letter to Alexander Hamilton, U.S. 
Treasury Secretary, on 25 November 1789 explained (Hamilton had solicited advice on how to 
fund the national debt from leading financiers and politicians such as Bingham),  
The Credit of the Funds [the national debt] must essentially depend on the permanent 
Nature of the Security; & if that is not to be relied on, they will fall in value, the 
disadvantage of which, Government will experience by the payment of an exorbitant 
Interest, whenever it is compelled to anticipate its revenues, by the Negotiation of 
domestic Loans. … If we offer a less Substantial Security, we must Submit to a 
consequent Depreciation in the Value of our Funds…. A Government should therefore 
pledge every security it can offer, to engage the Confidence of the public Creditors, 
which, if once impaired, the pernicious Effects can be felt in all its future Dealings. 
(Syrett 1962, 5: 540-1) 
  
Bingham’s reference to “security” of a “permanent nature” would seem to mean government 
capital assets. And the only capital assets the Federal Government possessed at this time in any 
substantial quantities were its western lands.  
                                                 
22 See Grubb (2006b); Kemmerer (1939); Perkins (1994, 44-6); Rabushka (2008); Ratchford (1941, 10-2, 18, 21-2).   27
Financiers in Congress and among the founding fathers, such as James Wilson, also 
understood the importance of pledging land as security in order to secure loans (Jensen 1981, 
222). In 1784 Congress considered the “vacant territories” in its possession to be a “capital 
resource.” (JCC 26: 315-6)  Congress’ Board of Treasury recommended in 1786 that the 
proceeds of the first half-million acres of its western territories surveyed and put up for sale be 
pledged as “Collateral Security” for a current loan of $500,000 to the national government (JCC 
31: 893). Both financiers and Congress knew that lands were capital assets that affected credit. 
Along a similar vein, Hamilton in July of 1782 wrote, “The disposal of the unlocated 
lands will hereafter be a valuable source of revenue, and an immediate one of credit.” (Syrett 
1961, 3: 105—italic added)  As Secretary of the Treasury he said in his January 1790 “Report on 
Public Credit,” 
It is presumable, that no country will be able to borrow of foreigners upon better  
terms, than the United States, because none can, perhaps, afford so good security. Our 
situation exposes us less, than that of any other nation, to those casualties, which are the 
chief causes of expense; our incumbrances, in proportion to our real means, are less, 
though these cannot immediately be brought so readily into action, and our progress in 
resources from the early state of the country, and the immense tracts of unsettled 
territory, must necessarily exceed that of any other. The advantages of this situation have 
already engaged the attention of the European money-lenders… (Syrett 1962, 6: 89—
italics added) 
 
  Option Two became the founding choice. With the 4 August 1790 Funding Act Congress 
restructured its debt position by turning all its interest-bearing national debt into callable 
perpetuities with the yearly interest paid out of current-year revenues. The public domain was 
pledged to back that debt. In particular, the proceeds from any sale of the Federal Government’s 
western lands were dedicated to retiring the national debt. There was no rush, no pressure, and 
no mandate to reduce D via land sales immediately. The salient feature of the act with respect to 
the use of the public domain reads,   28
That the proceeds of the sales which shall be made of lands in the western territory, now 
belonging, or that may hereafter belong, to the united states, shall be, and are hereby 
appropriated towards sinking or discharging the debts, for the payment whereof the 
United States now are, by virtue of this act may be, holden, and shall be applied solely to 
that use, until the said debts shall be fully satisfied. (United States Congress, The Debates 
and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States, 2: 2251) 
 
Hamilton sent this act to William Short, U.S. agent in Europe—principally Holland—for 
securing U.S. loans, who reported that “the acts of Congress were well known here.” Dutch 
bankers who advised and interacted with Short in 1790 would also engage heavily in American 
land speculation within the next two years as the Holland Land Company (Livermore 1939, 205-
14; Syrett 1963, 7: 6, 176, 178). The importance of this part of the funding act is revealed in 
Hamilton’s notes that he prepared 1 December 1790 to aid President Washington in his second 
annual message to Congress. Therein, Hamilton’s states as his first item,  
Confidence that measures for the further support of the public Credit and for the payment 
of the interest and gradual extinguishment of the principal of the public debt will be  
pursued with zeal & vigour. And that as one mean to this a plan for the sale of the  
Western lands will be adopted, which will give them the effects intended, appropriating  
them to the sinking fund… (Syrett 1963, 7: 172-2) 
 
The importance of debt being backed by land can also be seen in William Short’s May 
1791 letter to Hamilton where he suggests in reference to potential European lenders that “It is 
possible also that it might be an agreeable circumstance to them to render them bonds for these 
loans or any part of them receivable in the land office of the U.S. for the purchase of lands 
agreeable to the prices fixed by law. This is only an idea which occurs as being an additional 
security against depreciation.” In August 1791 Hamilton answered Short with “There can be no 
objection to making the bonds…receivable in payment for lands at the price or prices which 
shall be fixed by law…” (Syrett 1965, 8: 325; 9: 2) 
Contemporaries knew how much land the Federal Government had, knew its approximate 
value, and believed the government had pledged the public domain and had the potential to sell   29
chunks of it if necessary to cover and service the national debt. It is the pledge to back and 
eventually redeem that debt with land assets, rather than any promise to quickly sell those assets 
to retire the debt right away, that mattered most.
23  Contemporaries could also observe the 
Federal Government following through on this pledge. Some of the first monies from land sales 
post-1790 going into the sinking fund created by the 1790 Funding Act to redeem public debt 
were from the 1792 Erie Triangle land sale to Pennsylvania (Adams 1960, 3: 113, 197). By the 
mid-1790s the Federal Government may have been seen as a good credit risk in spite of its recent 
checkered past of defaulting on its debt payments, because by the early 1790s it had acquired 
enough land assets and had credibly committed those land assets to fully backing and then 
eventually redeeming its debt. The Federal Government’s land assets made it solvent. 
How Should the Land Be Controlled, Distributed, and Sold? 
  Non-European Native Americans (Indians) occupied much of the western lands ceded by 
the states to the national government. Land was to be sold by the national government, not by the 
Indians. As such, the Federal Government via treaty and coercion acquired land cessions from 
Indians when needed, amounting to about 22 million acres between 1795 and 1802 (Lebergott 
1985, 211). See Map 3. Federal Government policy was to prevent hostilities between Indians 
and white settlers, but when conflicts arose the government was often powerless to stop them and 
when the government did have the power it was seldom tolerant of Indian resistance. The de 
facto policy was to treat Indians like bears and wolves. They were on the land and could be a 
dangerous nuisance if they did not voluntarily vacate lands coveted by white settlers. In case of 
                                                 
23 For more on the land-to-debt linkage, see Grubb (2007b, 136-41); Robbins (1942, 15); Taylor (1950, 40); Syrett 
(1962, 5: 526); and the United States Congress, The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States, 
1: 647-54 (13 July 1789); 2: 1345-7 (22 February 1790); 4: 1314 (15 December 1794), 1017-8 (23 December 1794); 
and 5: 60 (18 February 1829). Even by 1832 congressmen still referred to the requirement of applying the proceeds 
from the sale of public lands first to payments on the national debt and only after the national debt was paid off 
could they use the proceeds for some other use (United States Congress, The Debates and Proceedings in the 
Congress of the United States, 5: 1452 (27 December, 1832), 1475-8 (4 January 1832)). See also Jensen (1981, 414).   30
 
Map 3   Indian Cessions to the Federal Government in the Northwest Territories, 1789-1816 
 
Source: Robbins (1942, 23). 
 
  
hostile resistance, like bears and wolves, Indians were to be forced out or killed. This was often 
done by local militias, but sometimes by Federal military involvement.
24 
In 1786 Virginia delegates proposed that Congress “destroy [the Indians] if they do not 
make concessions” in the Ohio territories. In a letter to General Josiah Harmar in 1790, General 
Henry Knox, Secretary of War, in reference to hostilities by the Indians in the Ohio region said, 
                                                 
24 See ASP: PL (1: 21-2, 63, 66, 146, 173); JCC (5: 616-7; 6: 1076-9; 1082-3; 25: 681-94; 26: 134-5, 152-4, 275; 27: 
453-65, 625-6, 658; 28: 88, 118-20, 136-9, 159-62, 172-4, 330-3, 423-6, 431-2; 29: 735-7, 806, 822; 30: 133-5, 185-
95, 257-8, 340, 342-3, 346-53, 368-81, 425-9; 31: 490-3, 562-3, 656-8, 760; 32: 66-9, 237-8, 266-9, 327-32, 347-9, 
365-76; 33: 385-91, 407-8, 410-11, 454-63, 477-81, 504-5, 696-7, 707-14; 34: 59-60, 108, 124-6, 139-40, 160, 164-
5, 267-9, 299-300, 326-7, 342-5, 368-71, 411-4, 423-5, 476-9). The number of American troops both militia and 
Federal deployed in battles against the Indians was relatively small and thus relatively inconsequential in terms of 
costs and efforts. Being under 2,600 men and often under 1,000 men, their numbers were many times smaller than 
the troops employed in battles during the Revolution, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Civil War. Their 
numbers, and hence cost and effort, were on the order of the forces deployed to crush Shay’s Rebellion in 1787 
(Dougherty 2001, 107-21; Gates 1968, 59-61; Henretta et al. 1987, 227-30, 239, 243-5; Jensen 1981, 357-9; Pul 
2008, 205-9; Tindall 1988, 318-9).   31
“No other remedy remains, but to extirpate, utterly, if possible, the said banditti.” After a few 
military setbacks, General “Mad Anthony” Wayne with a force of about 2,600 men broke Indian 
power over the region at the battle of Fallen Timbers near the mouth of the Maumee River in 
1794 and thus secured the Ohio and Indiana territories for the U.S. government. The template 
was set for Federal Government dealings with Native Americans for decades to come.
25 
  For whites, the public domain became a fact in 1784 with the Virginia cession. Between 
then and 1787, Congress confirmed its authority over the ceded lands and established the basic 
principals and policies of land distribution and governance for decades to come. This was 
accomplished by the passage of three great ordinances—the Ordinance of 1784, the Ordinance of 
1785, and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787—initiated under Thomas Jefferson and then fleshed 
out and carried forward by others in Congress—with the 1785 and 1787 Ordinances superseding 
the 1784 Ordinance. These ordinances codified many of the intentions stated by Congress as 
early as 1780 regarding the ceded territories. They established conditions and procedures in the 
territories for moving from direct Federal rule through democratic self-government and finally to 
the formation and admission as new states into the union under terms of equality of 
representation with the original 13 states in Congress. They outlined potential new states. When 
new states were admitted to the union, however, they did not get possession of the remaining 
public domain within their borders. The Federal Government retained possession of its unsold 
lands regardless. This gave the Federal Government some continuing leverage over fledgling 
states. Finally, a provision in the Ordinance of 1784 to ban slavery in all the lands west of the 
Alleghenies after 1800 was lost in Congress by a single vote, but the subsequent Northwest 
                                                 
25 See Dougherty (2001, 107-12); Gates (1968, 59-61); Henretta et al. (1987, 227-30, 239, 243-5); Hibbard (1939, 
41-2); Jensen (1981, 357-9); Pul (2008, 205-9); Tindall (1988, 318-9).   32
Ordinance of 1787 was able to prohibit slavery in the territories north of the Ohio River along 
with prohibiting life-leases and quitrents.
26 
The 1785 and 1787 Ordinances divided the Northwest Territories into uniform townships 
measuring six miles square. These townships were subdivided into 36 one-mile square 
sections—one square mile being equal to 640 acres. A half-section was 320 acres and a quarter-
section was 160 acres, and so on. One section out of every 36 was reserved “for the maintenance 
of public schools.” These lands were to be surveyed using the “magnetic needle” to establish 
“true meridian” boundaries and then sold fee-simple into private ownership through competitive 
public auctions. Settlement was to be a lawful, patterned, and orderly process with secure 
property rights given to individual owners.  
This rectangular pattern of property division and ownership, possibly derived from 
Dutch, Roman, and some New England precedents, was a rationalization of land-boundary 
structures. It contrasted sharply with the traditional “metes and bounds” land-boundary 
configurations found in England and in much of colonial and post-revolutionary America, such 
                                                 
26 See Davis et al. (1972, 102-6); Donaldson (1884, 63-88, 146-63); Feller (1984, 6-9); Gates (1968, 59-74); 
Henretta et al. (1987, 202, 214, 224-5); Hughes and Cain (2007, 92-8); Jensen (1981, 348, 352-5); JCC (26: 118-21, 
247-52, 255-60, 274-9, 324-30; 27: 446-53; 28: 251-6, 298-303, 309-17, 335-40, 342-3, 370-81; 30: 133-5, 230-1, 
255-7, 262, 390-4; 32: 281-3, 314-20, 334-43; 34: 95-100, 107, 243-6, 277-81, 297-9, 301-3, 306-10); North and 
Rutten (1987, 25-7); Tindall (1988, 267-70). On 19 April 1784 Congress voted on whether the language banning 
slavery in all the western territories ceded to the national government should remain in the 1784 Land Ordinance. 
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majority. The motion failed. Maryland, Virginia and South Carolina voted “no” with every single delegate except 
Thomas Jefferson from those states (7 in total) voting against the motion. North Carolina was divided with 
Williamson for and Spaight against. The motion would have passed (received seven state “yes” votes) if any one of 
the following had happened: one more New Jersey delegate would have attended and voted yes; Spaight from North 
Carolina would have voted yes; either Hardy or Mercer from Virginia would have voted yes; or Delaware delegates 
would have been present and voted yes. Finally, if the motion had been worded in the reverse, namely if the motion 
would have been to remove the words banning slavery from the original draft of the 1784 Land Ordinance, then that 
motion too would have failed and the ban would have stayed. When the vote is reversed only three states would 
have cast yes votes—four short of the majority needed to pass such a motion and so the ban would have stayed in 
the Ordinance. The razor’s edge margins by which the historical trajectory of the nation could have been 
dramatically and fundamentally changed on 19 April 1784 is a rather sobering consideration (JCC 26: 247).   33
as in Virginia and Maryland. Under metes and bounds, land boundaries typically followed 
natural contours and breaks, such as creeks, ridge lines, swell impressions, and so on, which in 
turn led to irregular land-plot shapes and sizes. The choice to replace metes-and-bounds with 
rectangular land boundaries had economic advantages. Rectangular patterns reduced survey costs 
(the government had to survey land before selling it); reduced boundary disputes between land 
owners by making boundaries clear, unchanged by natural events (e.g. naturally shifting river 
beds), and easy to adjudicate; and reduced odd lot sizes and shapes that were harder to use and to 
sell. All these advantages increased the overall value of the public domain and hence what price 
the government could command when sold. It did this in part by enhancing the value of an 
average acre to a private property owner by rationalizing land market transactions with less 
idiosyncratic qualities to boundaries thereby creating firmer property rights.
27 
The 1785 and 1787 Ordinances also established minimum acreage sizes for public land 
sales, i.e. 640 acres. In 1800 it was reduced to 320 acres, and in 1804 it was reduced again to 160 
acres where it stayed through 1819. Why was such a large minimum purchase requirement 
chosen? The average farm size in the northern U.S. in 1800 was only 125 to 150 acres (Lebergott 
1985, 185). As such, a 640 acre plot, or even a 320 acre plot, was several times the size of the 
typical farm. Therefore, the minimum acre purchase requirement did not reflect some natural 
economies of scale in farming for this period.  
The choice to require these large minimum acre purchases may have been due to 
economic advantages gained by the government. For example, this requirement reduced survey 
costs. It allowed more land to be surveyed in a given space of time and so brought land under the 
auctioneer’s gavel more quickly. Surveying a square of 640 acres would amount to “chain” or 
                                                 
27 See Adams (1960, 3: 222); Davis et al. (1972, 102-6); Donaldson (1884, 189-90, 197, 576-8, 615-6); Feller (1984, 
6-8); Henretta et al. (1987, 224-5); Libecap and Lueck (2009).   34
“pace” measuring four miles of distance. By contrast, if the government divided the 640 acres 
into four 160-acre squares or into sixteen 40-acre squares, then surveying would amount to chain 
or pace measuring six and ten miles of distance, respectively. In addition, more corner boundary 
markers would need to be established—4 for one 640-acre square, 9 for four 160-acre squares, 
and 25 for sixteen 40-acre squares. 
The large minimum acre purchase requirement may have served another economic 
function, namely allowing purchasers to capture the externality effects on adjacent acres of land 
improvements the purchaser implemented. In a frontier region where much of the land is initially 
unoccupied the value of a particular acre depends on the degree of development of adjacent 
acres. Selling large lots, much larger than the typical farm, meant that the purchaser would be 
able to reap some of the spill-over value on adjacent acres of his land improvements within his 
purchased allotment. He could capture that externality effect, being now capitalized into the 
value of that land, by selling those adjacent acres in the marketplace. If land were sold in smaller 
lots, buyers would not necessarily know who would own the adjacent lands or what would be 
done with them. As such, buyers could not gauge the true value of any particular small lot that 
they were considering for purchase from the government. Large minimum tract sales may have 
been a way to make sure that initial development externalities could be internalized by the 
purchaser and so maximize the sale price the government could command at auction. 
Finally, the 1785 and 1787 Ordinances also established the minimum price per acre, 
payment credit conditions, and methods of sale. Minimum prices per acre were discussed above 
and appear to reflect a rough guess as to what the deflated long-run equilibrium value of land 
was given the pace of settlement. The method of sale was to be at competitive public auction 
venues in the relevant districts where the land was, with the lands sold for fee-simple ownership   35
to the highest bidder above the minimum price. In 1785 only immediate payment was accepted, 
but over time the upfront payment portion was reduced and the length of credit extended. In 
1787 payment requirements were amended to one-third upfront and the rest in three months. In 
1796 they were further amended to one-half paid within 30 days and the remainder in one year. 
After 1800 they were amended even further to one-fourth paid within 30 days and the balance 
over four years including 6 percent interest. The credit system often suffered from abuse, 
corruption, and non-payment. The auction system occasionally suffered from corruption and 
non-competitive manipulation at the local level. The credit part of this system ended in 1820 
with a return to upfront payment only.
28 
The new Constitution affirmed Congress in possession and jurisdiction over the western 
ceded territories and in its intention to create new states out of said territories. It also protected 
the border-sovereignty of existing states and guaranteed all states, new and old, republican forms 
of government (Article IV, sections 3 and 4). Congress under the Constitution carried the 
structure of the Land Ordinances of 1784, 1785, and 1787 created under the Confederation 
forward largely intact, making only minor modifications periodically thereafter.
29 
Epilogue 
Choices made over land policy in the founding era had a lasting impact on the nation. 
They established the Federal Government as the largest land owner in North America and as the 
manager of the public domain, a role in which it has continued to the present day. The western 
lands from the Appalachian Mountains to the Mississippi River had been more or less peaceably 
and successfully transferred from the original 13 states to the national government. The national 
                                                 
28 See Davis et al. (1972, 102-6); Donaldson (1884, 189-90, 197, 576-8); Feller (1984, 8-13); Gates (1968, 59-72, 
121-43); Henretta et al. (1987, 224-5); Hughes and Cain (2007, 92-100). 
29 See Davis et al. (1972, 104); Donaldson (1884, 13); Feller (1984, 7); Gates (1968, 73-4). For the debates on these 
issues at the 1787 Constitutional Convention, see Farrand (1966, 1: 22, 28, 117, 121, 202, 206, 226-7, 231, 237, 245; 
2: 39, 47, 133, 159, 188, 220, 313, 316, 321, 324, 454-66, 470, 628; 3: 119-20, 223-7, 404).   36
government established rules whereby these lands could be acquired by citizens and new states 
could be formed. The rights to property had been clearly defined. Land would be distributed by 
the auctioneer’s gavel for cash and credit in fee simple ownership to competing citizens and to 
soldiers who earned their land warrants through service to the nation. There would be no 
“colonies” of eastern states in the western territories, no life-leases, no quitrents, and, in the 
Northwest Territories, no slavery. There would be no landed aristocracy given large tracts of the 
public domain based on nobility of birth, political power, or private treaties with Native 
Americans. By 1800 some 387,000 Americans lived in the trans-Appalachian territories, about 
7.3 percent of the U.S. population, and two new states carved out of these territories had been 
formed and admitted to the union, Kentucky and Tennessee. The sectional conflict over power 
within Congress that threatened to dissolve the union at the end of the Revolution was 
transformed into a contest over new state formation and admission, a peaceful conflict that 
would last at least a half century before devolving into civil war (Henretta et al. 1987, 202, 204, 
214, 221-9; Historical Statistics 1975, 1: 8, 24-37). 
The Federal Government was born land rich and asset-value rich. It chose to use its land 
assets to back the national debt, pledging the proceeds from land sales to be used, by law, only to 
redeem the national debt and nothing else. This land policy helped stabilize the national 
government’s financial position and put the U.S. on a sound credit footing by the mid-1790s. The 
national debt was finally paid off in 1834, and Congress debated what it could now do with its 
remaining land. Freed from the 1790 Funding Act restriction, Congress could either continue to 
sell its land but now use the revenues on other projects, or Congress could devise some other 
land-transfer schemes that did not involve getting significant revenues from land sales, such as 
homesteading, land grants for transportation development, and the creation of national parks.   37
One final legacy of these early choices was perhaps unintended, but nevertheless became 
a game-changer for U.S. history. By 1800, the Spanish/French obstruction of American 
navigation through New Orleans threatened not only the value and viability of U.S. western 
lands, but posed the threat of these areas breaking away to form a separate country or merging 
with nearby Spanish/French colonies. In order to retain the loyalty of these western citizens and 
the viability and value of these lands, Thomas Jefferson sought free navigation of the Mississippi 
River and the purchase of New Orleans from Napoleon—the current owner. An unexpected 
change in fortune led the French to offer the whole Louisiana territory to the U.S. on relatively 
cheap and easy terms. The 1803 Louisiana Purchase more than doubled the size of the U.S. with 
almost all these lands falling under Federal jurisdiction and control to be administered following 
the policies laid down in the 1780s and 1790s. While not without constitutional controversy—it 
is unclear that purchasing foreign territories is within the constitutional power of Congress, the 
end result continued the Federal Government’s land possession and management role into the 
20
th century (Henretta et al. 1987, 231-4; Lewis 1998, 12-32; Tindall 1988, 347-52).   38
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